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CAN FRAUD BE PURGED?
L
Can fraud be purged? Suppose that B makes to A a false,
fraudulent and material representation of fact upon which B
relies and which induces him to act. B attempts to purge his
fraud by making his representation good. Can he do so?
Let us take a concrete case. B -to induce A to purchase a
certain mortgage upon Blackacre falsely and fraudulently repre-
sents that the mortgage is a first mortgage. In truth the mortgage
is a second mortgage. A, relying upon the representation, agrees
to purchase the mortgage three months from date. B thereafter
pays and discharges the first mortgage so that the mortgage pur-
chased by A becomes in truth a first mortgage. When, if ever,
will B's discharge of the first mortgage cure the fraud previously
perpetrated on A?
Many other similar cases may be imagined. B may fraudu-
lently represent that he has good title to Blackacre, or that the
title is free and clear from incumbrances, or that certain bonds
are first mortgage bonds, or that certain improvements have
been made. In all these cases and in many others that might be
put, the facts may ultimately be made to square exactly with the
representation. The question which we shall consider is whether
the fraudulent party can improve his legal position by making
true that which he previously had fraudulently represented to be
true, assuming, of course, that the defrauded party in no way
assents to what might be described as "specific repentance."
It is of course familiar law that a defrauded party has two
courses open to him upon discovery of the fraud. He may return
whatever he has received and rescind the whole transaction. He
may affirm the transaction, and sue for damages in deceit. If the
transaction has not been wholly executed he may likewise invoke
the fraud as a defense,--provided of course that he seasonably
returns whatever he has received and disaffirms. This, liowever,
is simply rescinding an executory bargain as compared with
undoing a completed transactioni. Broadly speaking, therefore,
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the defrauded party has but two options open,-to rescind and
recover whatever he has paid or parted with, or to affirm and
sue for damages..
It is also plain that the repentance of the fraudulent party
may occur at any stage in the proceedings. Conceivably he might
make his false representation good even before its falsity is dis-
covered and before it is acted on. Again, he may make the rep-
resentation true after it has been acted on, but before the de-
frauded party has made any election to affirm or disaffirm.
Finally, the fraudulent party may conform the facts to the rep-
.resentation after the defrauded party has discovered the fraud
and taken some step for his protection either by way of rescission,
or by bringing an action of deceit, or by setting up the fraud as
a defense to any rights asserted by the fraudulent party. These
situations seem to exhaust all the real possibilities of the case.
They will be considered in inverse order.
IL
What are B's rights where he is induced by A to act upon
a false and fraudulent representation, and after he has discov-
ered the fraud and has asserted rights based upon it, A, without
B's assent, makes the representation good? Can A in that case
defeat an action for rescission? Has B in that case a defense to
an action of deceit? If the transaction be still executory, can A
destroy the defense of fraud by making his representation good
against B's will? Each situation will be taken up in turn.
On principle, A cannot defeat rescission by making the false
representation good, after B has elected to rescind. A transac-
tion procured by fraud is voidable at the election of the de-
frauded party. This right of election is vested in the defrauded
party at the moment the fraud is consummated. According to
circumstances it may be exercised either at law or in equity. On
principle, it would seem that this right being already vested in
the defrauded party, cannot be taken away by the fraudulent
party, nor can he substitute something else-therefor. Still less
can the fraudulent party determine how the defrauded party shall
elect, or the consequences of an election, if made. To permit
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the fraudulent party, by making his representation true to affirm
the transaction and defeat the election to rescind, would enable
him to force a compromise upon terms to which the defrauded
party does not assent. A compromise is essentially a matter of
contract in which both parties must concur. Certainly, the law
should not, even if it could, permit a fraudulent party to dictate
the terms upon which his own fraud shall be adjusted.
Merritt v. Robinson I was an action of replevin for a mule.
The evidence tended to show that Merritt (the defendant below)
induced the plaintiff Robinson to trade the mule for a pony,
Merritt knowing and concealing that the pony was mortgaged to
one Pierce. Robinson, on discovery of the facts, tendered the
pony (on Sunday) to Merritt and demanded the mule. Merritt
declined to rescind, and after this action was brought obtained
a release of the mortgage from Pierce. The court in deciding
that the fraudulent concealment would 'entitle Robinson to re-
scind, and that the release of the mortgage after action brought
was no defense, said by English, C. J.:
"Appellant could not defeat appellee's (Robinson's) right
of action for the mule by procuring the pony to be released from
the mortgage after the commencement of the suit."
Thompson v. Coultas2 was a bill in equity to rescind an
exchange of lands upon the ground that the defendant fraudu-
lently represented that the title to his lands was perfect, and free
from incumbrances, although in truth these lands were subject
to judgment liens aggregating $13oo. After the bill was brought
the defendant (appellant) paid off the liens. The court below
held that this was no defense to the action and decreed rescission.
In affirming this decree the court said, by Walker, C. J.:
"Nor does it matter that the judgments have been paid since
the suit was commenced. When the appellees filed their original
bill they thereby rescinded the contract, and elected to recover
2 35 Ark. 483. The case ultimately went for the defendant below (Merritt)
on the ground that the plaintiff's tender was insufficient because made on
Sunday.
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back their property, and to place the appellant is statu quo, and
from that time forward, appellant could do no act unassented to
by appellees, which would revive the contract or change the right
of appellees to rescind. He, by his fault, placed it in the power
of appellees to rescind, and lie could not deprive them of that
right"
Moody v. North 3 was a bill in equity to rescind a contract
for the purchase of real estate on the ground that the defendant
(an executor) had fraudulently represented that he had power
to sell. After the bill was brought the defendant got in the title.
The court below decreed rescission. In affirming this judgment
the court said, by Geren, J.:
"But if a party fraudulently sell and convey an estate to
which he has no title the vendee, who comes into equity to rescind
the contract, will not be compelled to take an after acquired title
from the vendor."
Stevenson v. Marble I was a bill in equity brought to rescind
a fully executed purchase of stock and bonds of the V. Electric
Company on the ground that that purchase was procured by a
false and fraudulent representation that the bonds in question
were secured by a first mortgage, whereas in truth a prior mort-
gage was stil; outstanding. The complainazit gave notice of
rescission on April 14, x896, and brought the bill on April-29,
1896. The prior mortgage was paid off and cancelled in July,
1896, after the bill was filed. It was urged that this purged the
fraud and defeated the bill. In overruling this contention, Well-
born, J., said:
"I repeat that when the suit was brought the lien of $27,500
on the property of the V. Electric Company must necessarily have
impaired the value of the bonds of said company, secured by a
subordinate lien, as well as the value of the stock of the company,
*6 Humph. (Tenn.) 3o9. This case is all the stronger since in Ter !ssee
an after-acquired title may be held sufficient where there was no ft .ad in
the original contract. Blaclcnmore v. Shelby, 8 Humph. 439, 441; Elliott Y.
Blair, 5 Cold. 285, xCS.
184 FedL 23 (C C S. D. CaL).
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and that complainant's right, accruing in part therefrom, to
rescind the contract could not be defeated by a discharge of the
prior lien after suit was brought."
Grccn v. Chandler 5 was a case where suit was brought by
Chandler upon a promissory note given as part of the purchase
price of certain land. The defense was that the sale was pro-
cured by false and fraudulent representations as to the title to
the property. To meet this Chandler offered evidence that after
a tender of rescission by Green, he (Chandler) had put himself
in position to cure the defect. The court below, over Green's
exception, charged that if the defect had been cured the fraud
constituted no defense. In holding that this instruction was
error, the court said, by Roberts, J.:
"The fact that Chandler, after such abandonment (by Green)
cured the defect in his right, or that Watson offered to make a
good title upon the payment of the money by Green would not
defeat Green's right to rescind the contract."
The leading case of Dalby v. Pulen 6 is to the same effect.
In that case Sir George Wigram, having agreed to purchase cer-
tain real estate, paid the money into court and was let into pos-
session, pending a report by a master upon the title. Upon inves-
tigaton it appeared that there was a fatal defect in the chain of
title, which was known to. and concealed by the solicitor for the
plaintiff. Before the master's report upon the defect came in the
plaintiff bought in the outstanding interest, and asked for a
further refereoce to the master to determine whether the defect
had been cured. The court held that the plaintiff, though morally
innocent, was affected by the fraudulent concealment of his solic-
itor, and that in view of this fraudulent concealment, he was not
entitled to specific performance even though the defect had been
made good.
These cases seem to cover the situation fully where the fraud
"25 Tex. m&
i Russ. & IL 29
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is made good after it had been invoked by way of rescission or
defense. Two cases I were at law and were grounded on a rescis-
sion in pais as a condition precedent to legal relief. In Merritt v.
Robinson the defrauded party after such rescission sought to
replevy the mule of which he had been deprived by the fraud. In
Green v. Chandler the defrauded defendant, after tender of
rescission in pais successfully set up the fraud as a defense to his
note, even though the fraud had been made good before action
brought The other three _cases, Woods v. North, Thompson
v. Coultas and Stevenson v. Marble, were bills in equity for
rescission where rescission in pais was not a condition precedent
to maintenance of the bill, and where "specific repentance" after
the bill was brought was held to be no defense. In Dalby v.
Pullen the fraud was discovered in the course of a proceeding
for specific performance by a vendor who was morally innocent
but legally responsible for the fraudulent concealment of his solic-
itor. Even in this case specific reparation against the will of
the defrauded party was held unavailing and specific perform-
ance was denied to the morally innocent vendor. These cases
seem to establish that where the defrauded party has elected to
disaffirm the transaction, and has taken adequate steps so to do,
subsequent specific reparation by the fraudulent party against the
will of the defrauded party will not defeat the- disaffirmance
whether the defrauded party sue in equity or at law and whether
the fraud be invoked as a ground of defense or as a ground of
affirmative relief.
A different question is presented where the defrauded party,
instead of electing to rescind, has elected to sue for damages. In
such a case what is the effect of specific reparation upon damages,
assuming that such reparation is made after action brought and
without the assent of the party defrauded? On the one hand it
may be urged that unless such reparation is applied in mitiga-
tion of damages the plaintiff is unjustly enriched. On the other
'Merritt v. Robinson, 35 Ark. 483; Green v. Chandler, 2S Tex. 4&
*Cf., Richmond v. Gray, 3 Allen (Mass.) 2S; Boynton y. Hazelboom,
14 Allea (Mass.) xio: Burke v. Schreiber. x83 Mass. 3.
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hand it may be urged that the fraudulent party should not be
allowed credit for a benefit which he thrusts upon the plaintiff
against his will. The cases which touch the precise question are
few, so that it must be decided in the light of principle rather
than by authority.
In many cases the facts cannot be conformed to the repre-
sentation. In other cases reparation can only be made with the
concurrence and assent of the plaintiff. Thus if the title to the
property be falsely represented to be perfect, although in truth
there is an outstanding interest, the representation cannot be made
good unless the plaintiff assents to conveyance of the outstanding,
interest to him. Title cannot be put into him against his wilL
In a few cases the representation may be made good without the
actual concurrence of the plaintiff, as where the defendant dis-
charges outstanding liens held by third parties. The latter case
presents the greatest difficulty, since the *plaintiff does in fact
receive a benefit, though without his assent or concurrence.
Practically speaking subsequent reparation cannot abso-
lutely make good thewrong, even though the false representation
be ultimately made good to the letter. The plaintiff has been
subjected to a risk and a detriment which would not have existed
if the fraud had not been committed. It is one thing to purchase
a property actually free from encumbrances, or a bond secured
by a valid first- mortgage, and quite a different thing to purchase
a property from which the liens are subsequently removed or a
bond which ultimately becomes secured by a valid first mortgage.
So long as the defects exist the purchaser is to a greater or less
extent at the mercy of third parties, and further cannot use or
dispose of the property as he might have done had the fact corre-
sponded to the representation. Subsequent reparation may pro-
tect him for the future, but it cannot undo the past. In other
words, subsequent reparation, even if swiftly made, cannot wholly
mitigate the damages caused by the defendant's wrong. How
closely it may approach complete mitigation without ever reach-
ing it must depend on the facts of each case. But the fact that
subsequent reparation cannot be made complete is a circumstance
to be taken into account in considering how far if at all such miti-
44 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
gation of damages may be thrust upon the plaintiff against his
wilL
It is a well-settled principle of quasi-contracts that a party
cannot be compelled to pay for a benefit conferred without his
assent. The obligation to pay for benefits received is essentially
equitable in its nature and will not be imposed in favor of a
volunteer,9 or in favor of one who has intentionally violated his
legal obligations, 0 or in favor of a party who has committed a
fraud."1 Nor can a defrauded party be compelled to assent to
specific reparation in oruer to mitigate his damages.1 2 The
defendant is ex hypothesi a fraudulent volunteer. He is seeking
to compel the plaintiff to account for a benefit which the plaintiff
was powerless to prevent, to which he has not assented, and to
which he could not have been compelled to assent had such assent
been a condition precedent to his receiving it. The defendant
confessedly comes into court with unclean hands. Under such
circumstances he is in no position to claim the benefit of the prin-
ciples of quasi-contracts which are equitable in their nature. The
claim of unjust enrichment cannot on principle be sustained.
Further considerations reinforce this conclusion. In the
first place, as we have seen, the mitigation is only partial. De-
fendant cannot undo the risk to which the plaintiff has been sub-
jected in the past, though it may make the future safe. The diffi-
culty in determining the extent of the mitigation (even if it could
otherwise be permitted) may well weigh against granting such
relief to a wrongdoer and volunteer.13 In the second place,
damages at law are payable in money, not property. To permit
the defendant to compel the plaintiff to account for the benefit
received would in effect permit the defendant to pay pro tan to
in kind instead of in cash. In the third place the mitigation sug-
gested would be a direct encouragement to the commission of
fraud. To determine the damages according to the situation at
Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, x23 Mass. 28; 9 Cyc. 252, note 6o and cases
cited.
" Bowen v. Kimball, 2o3 Mass. 364, and cases cited.
' See Sibley Y. Stickney, igo Mass. 4.
"First Nat Bank v. Hackett, 159 Wis. 113; Nash v. Minnesota Title
Ins. & Trust Co. z6.3 Mass. r74..r8.3 (head note inadequate).
"Nash v. Minnesota Title Ins. & Trust Co., z63 Mass. 574, 583.
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the time of trial would minimize to that extent the danger to the
wrongdoer, and correspondingly increase the risk to the party
defrauded. All three considerations bear strongly against a rule
in conflict with the basic principles of quasi-contracts, favorable
to the wrongdoer and correspondingly unfavorable to the party
defrauded.
It must be admitted, however, that the few immediate
authorities are not altogether harmonious. It has been held that
subsequent reparation is a bar to punitive or exemplary dam-
ages. 14 It would seem, however, that in both cases last cited 15
the reparation was made before the defrauded party brought
his action for deceit or set up the fraud in recoupment of the
plaintiff's claim. Conceivably this may make a difference, as we
shall see later. Moreover, as punitive or exemplary damages are
at best unscientific, in that they are based upon the defendant'l
turpitude rather than upon the plaintiff's injury, it may well be
urged that one who had undone his wrong so far as he could
ought not to be held to pay "smart money." If this is all these
cases stand for they may perhaps be supported in jurisdictions
where punitive damages are permitted. In any event, Barber v.
Kilbourn 16 seems to be confined to punitive damages, if not over-
thrown by the recent Wisconsin case of First Nat. Bank v.
Hackett.17
A more serious authority is Sonnesyn v. Akin.18 " In that
case the plaintiff brought suit on November 26, 1902, alleging
that on September 30, 19o2, the defendants, by falsely represent-
ing that they (defendants) had title to certain lands, induced the
plaintiff to agree to purchase the lands'and to pay therefor by
instalments, the last instalment to be paid and conveyance to be
made on January I, 19o3. The declaration further alleged that
the plaintiff had paid nearly $13,ooo under the contract in reli-
z'Barber v. Kilbourn, t6 Wis. 485; Nye v. Merriam, 35 Vt. 438. But see
First Nat. Bank v. Hackett, 159 Wis. x3.
Barber v. Kilbourn, 16 Wis. 485; Nye v. Merriam, 35 Vt. 438.
is x6 Wis. 485.
1T 59 Wis. 113.
2A 14 N. D. 248. 1o4 N. W. o26
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ance upon the representations. The answer admitted the con-
tract and payment, but alleged that the defendants had acquired
title to the property long prior to January i, 19o3, the date when
conveyance wvas to be made. The jury by a special verdict fotind
that the plaintiff was induced to enter into the-contract and pay
some $13,ooo by the false representations alleged, and that on
the date when the action was brought the defendants had no title
to the lands. On this verdict, the trial court rendered a judgment
for the plaintiff in the sum Of $13,ooo, but later on motion for a
ne , trial set it aside upon proof that on January x, i9o3, the
defendants had title to the lands and were able and ready to per-
form their agreement. The appellate court held that it could
not be said that the trial court abused its discretion in setting
aside the verdict, and this is all that the case actually decides.
But two of the three judges went further and in an elaborate
dictum held that the action was for deceit; that since the defend-
ants were ready to convey at the time stipulated in the contract
the plaintiff suffered no damage and could not recover, since the
action for deceit affirmed the contract. On the other hand, Fisk,
J., dissented on the ground that the action should be held to be
for rescission, and in that case the fact that the defendants had
made their representations good after action brought would be
no defense.
It may be that the dicta in this case may be supported on its
peculiar facts. The action was brought before the time for per-
formance by the defendants had arrived. It was clearly open to
the plaintiff to disaffirm, but this, according to the majority of
the court, he did not do. On the contrary, according to the
majority, he affirmed the contract by bringing an action for deceit
instead of rescission. If so, he still left it open to the defend-
ants to perform at the time stipulated for their performance. As
he sued in deceit before it could be known whether they could or
would perform their agreement, which was still executory, it
may be plausibly urged that the action was brought before he
suffered damage by reason of their fraud. If so, recovery might
be denied in deceit on the ground that the action was premature,
instead of on the ground that after action brought the defendants
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had mitigated the damage by putting themselves in position to
fulfil their contract. Taking the case on its facts, even the dicta
of the majority scarcely go to the length that a fraudulent de-
fendant may mitigate damages actually suffered by making his
representations good after an action of deceit has been brought.
An authority more nearly in point is First Nat. Bank v.
Ilackett.1 9" That was an action for deceit to recover damages for
inducing the plaintiff to buy a note by representing that the note
was secured by a valid mortgage of certain land in Michigan. At
the trial there was evidence that the mortgage was given by a
dummy who did not have title to the property, but there was also
evidence of contracts by which the title could have been put in the
dummy, though in fact this was not done. The trial court in
substance instructed the jury that these contracts, if found to
exist, were the substantial equivalent of a valid mortgage. The
jury found for the defendant. Held, that this Instructron was
error. In answer to a special question the jury also found that
if the plaintiff, some eight months after the note was bought, had
assented to a subsequent arrangement, the note would have been
fully secured. Held, that the submission of this question was
error since the finding was immaterial. In so deciding, the court
said:
"The plaintiff had a right to stand upon its cause of action
for fraud, and was not obliged to enter into any negotiations
resulting in a substitution of its existing cause of action for some
other."
Two points are directly decided by this case. First, that
ability to make the false representation good, even though exist-
ing at the time when the representation is made, does not cure
its actual falsity. Second, that where the plaintiff has been in-
duced to act to his damage by a false representation, he is not
bound, even before action brought, to assent to specific reparation.
On the contrary, he may stand upon his cause of action for deceit
and insist upon money damages. If even before action brought
i 59 Wis. 113&
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tlue plaintiff cannot have specific r;airaion forced upon him
against his will, it seems plain that specific reparation after action
I rcught will not be available in mitigation of compensatory dam-
ages. Plainly, the Hackett case limits the earlier Wisconsin case
of Barber v. Kilbourn to the principle that a specific reparation
after the damage is suffered and the action accrues is only a bar
to punitive damages.
In Nash v. Minnesota Title Ins. & Trust Co.,20 though it
was alleged that the defendant represented to the plaintiffs that
the title to certain real estate was perfect and thereby induced the
plaintiff to purchase from defendant certain bonds secured by a
mortgage thereon, in truth there was a prior mortgage. The
defendant offered to prove that it had procured an assignment
of this prior mortgage to itself and had tendered a discharge
thereof to the plaintiff in mitigation of damages. It repeated the
tender at the trial. The trial court ruled that none of this evi-
dence could be considered in mitigation of damages. In affirm-
ing this ruling, Knowlton, J., said:
"The defendant. may hold and use its mortgage in any lawful
way, but the plaintiffs ought not to be compelled to receive the
discharge of it in mitigation of their damages after the expiration
of so long a time. If the.mortgage were discharged, it would
not, as matter of law, limit their recovery to normal damages.
If there had been no encumbrance they imight long ago have sold
their bonds on better terms than can be obtained now. Moreover,
the commission of the fraud, if fraud is proved, was a wilful
wrong, and the case is analogous to a wilful conversion of
property, and an offer to return it in mitigation of damages after
its condition has changed and its value has depreciated. Practi-
cally it might be difficult in this case to measure the amount that
should be allowed now -on account of a discharge of the mort-
gage in mitigation of damages. and we are of opinion that we
ought not to compel the plaintiff to accept the tender or to make
allowance in the assessment of damages as if they had ac-
cepted it."
This case clearly recognizes the right of the plaintiff to
determine whether it will accept or reject the proffered reparation
ax63 Mass. 574, 583 (case reversed on another point not material here).
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in specie. The result would clearly have been the same if the
defendant had discharged the prior mortgage without the plain-
tiff's consent. No distinction can successfully be made between
the case where the plaintiff's consent is essential to complete the
act of reparation and those cases where the act of reparation
does not require his concurrence in order to complete it. Under
this decision specific reparation cannot be forced on him against
his will.
This case also indicates two difficulties which would arise if.
a defendant could force specific reparation on the plaintiff against
his will. In the first place, no reparation can change the fact that
the plaintiff has been subjected to a risk by reason of the fraud,
which would not have existed had there been no fraud. In the
second place, the value of reparation at a subsequent time is
extremely difficult to determine. The difficulty is increased if the
reparation is at best only partial aside from this element of time.
The law may well refuse to permit the fraudulent defendant to
thrust such problems on the plaintiff against his will.
Another decision which supports the same principle is
Blancliard v. Ellis.2 1 That was an action upon the covenant
against encumbrances contained in a deed dated November 9,
1838. In fact, the land was subject to an attachment against the
grantor upon which the land was taken in execution on December
25, 1838. On Dee-ember 4, 1848, after the plaintiff had been
evicted by the judgment creditor, the defendant bought in the
judgment creditor's title. The present action was brought on
October i8, 1851. The defendant contended that when he bought
in the outstanding title of the judgment creditor it enured by
estoppel to the plaintiff, so that the plaintiff, in this action subse-
quently brought, could recover only nominal damages. The case
having been reserved for the full court upon the facts, that court
in deciding that the doctrine of estoppel could not be invoked to
defeat recovery of substantial damages said, by Thomas, J.:
"We place the decision of this case on this precise ground,.
"1 Gray (Mass.) 195. See also Medbury v. Watson, 6 Met. (Mass.) 246 ;
Cornell v. Jackson, 3 Cush. (Mass.) o6. And compare Baxter v. Bradbury,
2o Me. 26o.
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that where a deed of land has been made with covenants of war-
ranty, and the grantee has been wholly evicted from the premises
by a title paramount, the grantor cannot, after such entire evic-
tion of the grantee, purchase the title paramount and compel the
grantee to take the same against his will, either in satisfaction of
the covenant against encumbrances, or in mitigation of damages
for the breach of it."
It is true that Blanchard v. Ellis is a case of covenant, not a
case of fraud. But there is little distinction so far as the ques-
tion we are considering is concerned, -between a false covenant
that the premises are free from encumbrances, and a false repre-
sentation to the same effect, even though the action for breach of
the covenant sounds in contract, and the action for the false rep-
resentation sounds in tort. The difference is procedural rather
than substantial. Be that as it may, Blanchard v. Ellis stands
squarely for the principle that where damages have been suffered
by the defendant's wrong, the defendant cannot force specific
reparation upon the plaintiff either in satisfaction of the cause of
action or in mitigation of damages.
A further-analogy is presented by cases concerning the effect
of resale by a purchaser to whom a false warranty or false repre-
sentation has been made. Where a party has been induced to
purchase property by false representations, the weight of author-
ity is that a resale by him for as much or more than he paid is
neither a bar to a subsequent action of deceit 22 nor available in
mitigation of damages.23  So also a resale by the warrantee is
incompetent in mitigation of damages for breach of warranty.24
In these cases, of course, there is no specific reparation by the
fraudulent party or warrantor. He has done nothing to mitigate
his wrong. Instead, he relies on mitigation by subsequent events
in which he has no part, i. e., that the plaintiff has recouped him-
"Clark v. Morgan, etc, Bank, z96 Fed. 7o9 (D. C. Col), and cases cited;
20 CYC 13.
"Medbury v. Watson, 6 Met (Mass.) 246; 2o Cyc. 136;'cf., Stewart v.
Joyce. 2oz Mass. 191; Hall v. Paine, 224 Mass. 6.
"Brown v. Bigelow, io Allen (Mass.) 242; see also Cornell v. Jackson
3 Cush. (Mass) S0O&
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self by a resale. This by the weight of authority he cannot do.
The resale is-held to have no effect on the previous wrong either
.in bar or in mitigation of damages.
The weight of authority therefore seems to be in accord
with principle. Specific reparation against the will of the de-
frauded party will not defeat a rescission already made. Specific
reparation after action brought is no bar to an action of deceit
or to an action for breach of warranty, nor is it available in miti-
gation of damages.
III.
Suppose, however, that specific reparation is made after the
false representation has been acted on to the damage of the' de-
frauded party, but before he has elected whether he Will affirm
or disaffirm. In the previous section we considered the effect of
reparation after the iause of action had accrued and after it had
been asserted against the wrongdoer. We now consider the case
where the cause of action has accrued, but, before it is asserted,
reparation is made without the assent of the party wronged.
What is the effect of such reparation upon subsequent rescission?
What is its effect on the assertion of the fraud as a defense, in
case the transaction be executory? What is its effect on damages
in case a subsequent action of deceit is brought? In other words,
are the rights of the defrauded party lessened because reparation
is made without his assent before he determines how he will act?
On principle, reparation, against the will of the defrauded
party, should not- defeat subsequent rescission. The option to
rescind or to affirm became vested in him the moment the fraud
was consummated. His election to rescind is merely an exercise
of the option which he previously possessed. We have seen that
when once the option to rescind has been exercised, subsequent
reparation, against the will of the defrauded party, will not avail
to defeat it.25 If such reparation will not avail to defeat the
option after it has been exercised, it should not prevent the exer-
cise of the option itself. The option is itself in the nature of a
ISupra, notes i to 8, inclusive.
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right of action. To defeat it in effect affirms the transaction.
If the fraudulent party can in effect affirm the transaction by
making reparation the option is taken from the defrauded party
without his assent and transferred to the party who icommitted
the fraud. Plainly, the wrongdoer should not be permitted to
dictate to the party wronged, what the legal consequences of the
wrong shall be.
It may perhaps be urged that if the fraud be made good
before the defrauded party has taken any step grounded on the
fraud he has received exactly what he bargained for and should
abide by his bargain. It will perhaps be said that to permit
rescission in such a case would permit the defrauded party, upon
discovery of the fraud, to speculate in the light of past events at
the expense of the wrongdoer, and to affirm or disaffirm as his
interests, irrespective of the fraud, would dictate. But this is in
no sense unjust. The fraudulent party, when he committed the
fraud, knew that he thereby rendered the transaction voidable at
the election of the party defrauded. He chose to run that risk.
He certainly is in no position to complain if that option is exer-
cised again him. A party who by express agreement confers on
the other party a right to rescind at his election cannot defeat the
exercise of that election. In the case of a fraud the option is
conferred by law instead of by agreement. Certainly, the law
should not be solicitous to relieve one who has committed a fraud,
from the right to avoid, which that very fraud ha* conferred.
A contrary rule would permit the wrongdoer to speculate
at the risk of the party defrauded. When the defrauded party
is induced to act on the fraudulent representation he is sub-
jected. to" the risk that he will never receive what he bargains
for. This risk is thrown on him by the fraudulent party. He
still runs this-risk, eVen though the fraudulent party subsequently
make his representations good. To permit the fraudulent party
to stand on his bargain provided he makes his representations
good before he is caught and the defrauded party elects to dis-
affirm would be an incentive to fraud. As between the wrong-
doer and the wronged the risk should dearly be cast on the
wrongdoer.
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The cases already discussed indicate that such is the rule.
Thus reparation after rescission will not defeat rescission.2 6 So
also it has been held that one who has been defrauded may
stand upon the fraud and cannot be forced to assent to a subse-
quent arrangement by which the fraud would be made good.2T
Again, where a covenant against encumbrances has been broken
by an eviction, and before action brought, the covenantor buys
in the title paramount, the covenantor cannot directly by con-
veyance, or indirectly by the doctrine of estoppel, force such
title on the covenantee either in bar of a subsequent action or
in mitigation of damages. 28 So also the fact that the defrauded
party 29 or warrantee 30 has, before action brought resold the
property for as much or more than he paid for it, will neither
defeat the subsequent action,31 nor avail to mitigate damages.
3 2
It would seem that the exercise of an option to rescind cannot
be defeated by similar means, whether rescission is relied on
to undo an executed transaction or as a defense to further per-
formance of an executory bargain.
If specific reparation, against the will of the party wronged
will not defeat subsequent exercise of the option to rescind, it
plainly will not defeat subsequent assertion of the fraud as a
defense to the transaction if it still be executory. This is obvi-
ous in cases where tender of rescission is a condition precedent
to assertion of the defense of fraud and renders that defense
available. It must be equally true where the assertion of the
defense is itself a sufficient disaflirmance. The law is not so
inconsistent as to undo the transaction if it be executed, but
Supra. notes i to 8, inclusive.
SFirst Nat Bank v. Hackett, 159 Wis. 113; Nash v. Minnesota Title Ins.
& Trust Co., 163 Mass. 574. 583.
IBlanchard v. Ellis, i Gray (Mass.) 195; and see also Nash v. Minnesota
Title Ins. & Trust Co.. 163 Mass. .74 583.
" Medbury v. Watson, 6 Met. (Mass.) 246; Clark v. Morgan, etc., Bank,
x96 Fed. 700 (D. C. Col.). and cases cited.
"Brown v. Bigelow, io Allen (Mass.) 242; see also Cornell v. Jackson,
3 Cush. (Mass.) 5o6.
" Clark v. Morgan, etc., Bank, z.6 Fed. 709 (D. C. Col.).
Medbury v. Watson, 6 Met. (Mass.) 246; Brown v. Bigelow, 1o Allen
(Mass.) 242; see also Cornell v. Jackson, 3 Cush. (Mass.) So6. -
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nevertheless to enforce the bargain if it be executory. The right
to rescind on the ground of fraud necessarily includes the right
to defend on the same ground.
Suppose, however, that instead of electing to rescind the
plaintiff elects to affirm the transaction and sue for damages
after the defendant has made the fact confoiin to the repre-
sentation. This case differs from that considered in the previ-
ous section in that here the reparation takes place before the
election to affirm instead of afterwards. The question is whether
under these circumstances the reparation is to be considered in
mitigation of damages.
It may well be urged that when the cause of action has
once accrued (as we assume it has) no act by the defendant can
decrease the damages to which the plaintiff then became entitled.
There is much force in this suggestion. But if we apply the
same principles heretofore considered we shall see that the
situation which exists at the time when the plaintiff elects to
affirm or to disaffirm may well affect the damages which he is
entitled to recover.
If at the time when the plaintiff elects to keep the prop-
erty and affirm the transaction he knows that the false repre-
sentation has been made good his election to retain the property
is necessarily an election to accept the benefit thereby conferred.
If he does not desiie to accept entire property or benefit he
need only return the property and rescind the transaction. Since
ex hypothesi that choice is open to him at the time when he
decides to keep the property the decision to retain it is necessarily
a decision to retain it in its changed condition-assuming, of
course that he knows of the change. But if in the knowledge
that the benefit has been conferred and the value of the prop-
erty enhanced he chooses to accept that benefit, on ordinary
principles of quasi-contract he should take the benefit into ac-
count in mitigation of damages. But in this situation the obli-
gation to take the reparation into account in mitigation of dam-
ages flows from, the assent of the plaintiff' to such reparation and
not merely from the act of the defendant in making the repara-
tion.. This distinguishes the case from the situation considered
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in the last section, where the reparation took place after" the
plaintiff had made his election to rescind or to affimn.
If, however, at the time the action for deceit' is brought
the'plaintiff is ignorant that reparation has been made, he should
not be held to have coisented that such reparation be considered
in mitigation of damages. Knowledge is an essential element of
ratification.3 3 Acts done in ignorance of the 'facts do not
ratify. The election to affirm the fraud and seek compensa-
tion in money may well have been made in the exp&ctation that
such compensation would be paid in money. Conceivably the
plaintiff would have rescinded if compensation were to be made
in specie. Any consent to receive reparation in specie is lack-
ing. In the absence of such consent the plaintiff should not be
held liable to account for a benefit conferred by a volunteer with-
out notice to him. The knowledge of and consent to the re-
ceipt of the benefit, which alone can raise the obligation to ac-
count for it, are absent 3 ' If the wrongdoer desires that the
reparation shall operate in mitigation of damages he need only
inform the plaintiff and leave the plaintiff to determine whether
he will accept reparation in that form or rescind. As the wrong-
doer has not chosen to inform the plaintiff so that the plaintiff
can decide intelligently in the full light of all the facts, he can-
not justly complain, if he is treated as a volunteer to whom com-
pensation for specific reparation is denied..
It may perhaps be urged that this view is inconsistent with
Medbury v. Watson,3 5 and similar cases,es in which it was held
that a resale by the plaintiff, before action brought was neither
a bar to an action of deceit nor available in mitigation of dam-
ages. Such is not the case. In Medbury v. Watson the wrong-
doer had not repaired the wrong. He had done nothing on
which any assent of the plaintiff could operate. Non constat
m Cohen v. Jackson, 210 Mass. 328; Combs v. Scott, 12 Allen (Mass.) 493;
Pence v. Langdon, 99 U. S. 578; Dickson v. Patterson, 16o U. S. 4; Valley
v. Ostheimer, i59 Fed. 6s (C. C. A.); Manning v. Albee; ix Allen (Mass.)
2o. See also ante, note 12.
"Supra, note 12.
"6 Met. (M-ass.) 24
I Supra, notes 22 to 25.
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that if the false representations had been made good, the plain-
tiff would not have obtained a far larger price than he did.
3 7
The plaintiff by affirming the transaction had become absolute
master of the property purchased. It was no concern of the
wrongdoer whether the plaintiff sold the property or gave it
away. The resale by the plaintiff was not a benefit conferred
by the defendant for which the defendant could claim com-
pensation.38 This of itself distinguishes Medbury v. Watson and
cases like it.
IV.
What is the result where the representation is false whew
made, but is made good beforc it is acted on? If the transac-
tion has been wholly executed can the party who acts on the
represeritation either rescind or recover damages? If the trans-
action is an agreement which still remains executory is the
naked misrepresentation a defense?. In the situations already
considered the false representation was acted on while it was
still untrue. Here it has become true before any action is taken.
Is this a real distinction?
A naked false representation is not actionable unless it
cause damage.39 If it relate to an immaterial matter,40 or if it
be not relied on41 or if action in reliance thereon cause no legal
damage,42 no action for deceit will lie. So also, if the repre-
sentation is not what the law deems to be a false and fraudu-
lent representation, action thereon by the plaintiff to his dam-
'Brown v. Bigelow. zo Allen (Mass.) .
'So in Blanchard v. Ellis, x Gray (Mass.) 242, the purchase of the out-
standing paramount title by the defendant, without conveyance by the defend-
ant to-the plaintiff, was not a benefit for which the plaintiff could be. held to
account
ILamb v. Stone. i Pick. (Mass.) 526; Wellington v. Small, 3 Cush.
(Mass.) 145; Randall v. Hazelton, 12 Allen (Mass.) 412; Bradley v. Fuller,
t18 Mass. 239; Dudley v. Briggs. 141 Mass. 582; Graham v. Peale. 173 Fed. 9
(C. C A.).
'Hedden v. Griffin. x36 Mass. 22n. 23: Dawe v. Morris. t4o Mass. 188;
Palmer v. Bill, 8s Me. 352; Blair v. Buttulph, 72 Ia. 31, 33; Clark v.
Everhart. 63 Pa. St. 347. .a: Stone v. Robie. 66 Ut. 24g. 247.
Ming v. Woolfolk, x16 U. S. 599; Lilienthal v. Suffolk Brg. Co., zs4
Mass. z85, j88.
* Supra. note 39.
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age will not enable him to maintain deceit. In this class fall
expressions of opinion, 43 "sellers' talk," 44 and prophecies as to
the future.43 In other words, fraud without damage, or damage
without fraud will not sustain an action of deceit
These principles seem decisive in the case where the repre-
sentation is made good before it is acted on. In such a case the
elements of actionable fraud never coexist. While the repre-
sentation remains untrue the plaintiff does not act thereon to
his damage. When the plaintiff subsequently acts the fraudulent
element of the representation has ceased to exist. If the plaintiff
sustain damage, that damage is in no just sense a consequence
of the prior falsity of the representation. Under such circum-
stances the defendant, by making his representation good before
it is acted on prevents a cause of action from arising. This dif-
fers radically from invoking his subsequent reparation to de-
feat or mitigate a cause of action which has already arisen.
Since no cause of action has arisen, the plaintiff should neither
recover damages, 46 nor be permitted to rescind.
In Laws v. Fish,47 the plaintiff sued in deceit upon the
ground that the defendant, by falsely representing that the G.
Company was the owner of a certain lease induced the plaintiff
to purchase shares of its stock. The proof showed that when
the representation was made the G. Company was not the owner
of the lease, but that it became so shortly afterward. In hold-
ing that the plaintiff could not recover, the court said, by
Kalisch, J.:
"The plaintiff's proof established that the Gem Dredging
Company was not the owner of the lease at the time when the
representation to that effect was made by the defendant, but
that it did acquire the ownership thereof shortly afterwards.
Tryon v. Whitmarsh, i Met. (Mass.) i; Belcher v. Costello, 122 Mass.149
,Densing'v. Darling. 148 Mass. 5o4.
Dawe v. Morris, 149 Mass. i88; Knowlton v. Keenan, 46 Mass. 86.
wLams v. Fish, 86 N. J. L 321. 9o AtI. xo5 (N. J. Er. & Ap.); Ball v.
Farley. 81 Ala.288
686 N. J. L. 32r, go At. iio5 (N. J. Er. & Ap.).
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Under Byard v. Holmes, 34 N. J. L '296,4s this representation
was immaterial. Since the Gem Dredging Company did acquire
the ownership of .the lease it could make no difference in the
value of the plaintiff's stock whether the company owned the
lease on the day stated or not."
It does not clearly appear from the facts in this case
whether the representation was made good just before or just
after the plaintiff was induced to purchase his stock. The state-
ment that the representation had become immaterial lends some
color to the supposition that it was made good before it was
acted on. Even if it was made good shortly after it was acted
on the case may still be supported upon the supposition that
the action was brought after the plaintiff knew of the repara-
tion. Moreover, since the plaintiff failed to prove any damage
the case may be supported on that ground as well. In view of
these uncertainties the case is not perhaps a very persuasive
authority, but in view of the scarcity of decisions, it seems wise
to include it.
One point in Lames v. Fish, however, is worth comment. It
is said in that case that if the representation was made good it
became "immaterial." This suggestion seems unsound. The
materiality of a representation does not depend on its truth or
falsity. It depends on whether it was an efficient inducement to
the plaintiff's act.4 ' This is a question of fact dependent upon
the operation of the representation upon the plaintiff's mind.
On the other hand, if the representation be true at the time it
moves the plaintiff to act, the question whether it was false
when made may have ceased to be relevant. But in this case,
it is the previous falsity of the representation which has ceased
to be material, not the representation itself. This distinction
was apparently overlooked in Lams v. Fish. It diminishes the
weight to be given to the case.
A somewhat different question is presented by the case
'mThis case is not in point. It simply decided that a certain declaration
as too uncertain to be the basis of relief.
I Safford v. Grout. 12o Mass. 2o; Hindeman v. First Nat. Bank, 112 Fed.
93z, 945 (C. C A.); Edginton v. Fitzmaurce, 29 Ch. D. 459.
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where a party who has made a false representation, but made
it good before it is acted on, invokes the aid of the court to
enforce an executory bargain grounded on that representation.
On- this point the writer has found but a single dictum,50 by
Holmes, J., who said:
"The defendant argues that the plaintiff has suffered
nothing because the statement was made good before it was
acted on. We are not prepared to say that the fact that one
party to a transaction, A, has been guilty of a material fraud,
is purged of its effect if the representation is made good before
it is acted on by the other party, B. There would be much
force in the argument that, if B had known of A's fraud before
the bargain was complete, he would not have been likely to com-
plete it whatever the existing facts. People generally break off
their dealings with people who are trying to cheat them. The
fact that A has tried to cheat B is material, it may be said,
because it offers what according to common experience would
be a strong motive for not proceeding further."
There is considerable force in this suggestion. On the other
hand, it would scarcely be a defence to prove that in prior trans-
actions with other persons A had been a scamp and had com-
mitted fraud, larceny or embezzlement. It may well be that
if B had known these facts before the. bargain was completed
he would have immediately broken off relations and declined to
deal farther. But A's general bad character, even though con-
cealed, would scarcely taint a transaction otherwise free from
fraud, simply because B would probably decline to deal with A
if he knew of A's previous rascality. It may be, however, that
where A has tried to cheat B in this particular transaction the
rascality is an indelible ingredient of this particular bargain, even
though B, for reason of his own, changes his mind and makes
his representation good before it is acted on. If the bargain
" Reeve v. Dennett, 145 Mass. 23, 30, in which it was held that where
defendant had falsely represented that he owned certain land, but before that
representation was acted on, purchased the land on wortgage, it could not be
said that a finding that the representation had not been made good was unwar-
ranted by the evidence. Perhaps the dicta in Sonnesyn v. Akin, 14 N. D. 24
xo4 N. W. xoA6, look the other way.
60 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
be still executory, A may perhaps justly object to being com-
pelled to rely for future performance on one who has tried to
cheat him. So also the court might perhaps decline to affirm
the executory bargain in B's favor, where A seeks to rescind,
on the ground that B does not come into court with clean hands
as to this particular transaction, whether B comes into court
as plaintiff or is dragged in as defendant to a bill in equity for
rescission. In either case to affirm the bargain would in effect
give A affirmative relief, and this the court might well deny
to one who had attempted to cheat in the very case before it,
even though the attempted fraud was not in fact consummated.
On the grounds suggested by Holmes, J., and on this further
ground, this dictum may perhaps be supported in a case where
A is seeking the aid of the court to affirm and enforce a bar-
gain which is still executory.
V.
Broadly speaking, a fraud once committed cannot be purged
against the will of the party defrauded. The old proverb, "An
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure," still holds good.
Or, to put it another way, "An ounce of previous honesty is
worth a pound of specific repentance." On principle, and on
authority, specific repentance should not avail the wrongdoer
unless it prevents the wrong or unless the injured party chooses
to accept it instead of the relief which the law would otherwise
afford. This is both good law and good sense. People should
not be allowed to cheat their neighbors and then escape liability
by undoing the wrong with the fear of the law upon them.
Probably most embezzlers promise themselves to repay the "loan"
in a few days. But restitution is no bar to conviction for the
previous crime. Enforcement of civil liability and criminal
punishment are both aids to feeble consciences. Courts should
be slow, and are slow, to permit a party who commits a fraud
to escape or mitigate civil liability by making specific repara-
tion which the injured party is not willing to accept.
The better view and the weight of authority in so far as
there is authority seem to be as follows: Specific reparation
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against the will of the defrauded party, will neither defeat a
previous election to rescind nor mitigate damages where an ac-
tion of deceit has been previously brought. Even when specific
reparation has been made before the defrauded party has elected
whether he will rescind or affirm and sue for damages, it will
not defeat a subsequent election to rescind made with knowledge
of the facts, nor avail to mitigate damages which are sought in
ignorance of such reparation. If, however, the election to affirm
and sue for damages be made with knowledge of the reparation,
it may well be held that the injured party has assented to such
reparation and must account for the benefit received. Where
the misrepresentation is made good before it is acted on no
cause of action arises, and the party to whom it was made should
neither recover damages nor be permitted to set aside a trans-
action fully executed. It has been intimated, however, that if
in such a case the transaction is still executory the party who
made the false representation may be denied relief on the ground
that if the representation had been known to be originally false
the innocent party would never have made the contract. Per-
haps relief may likewise be denied in such a case to the party
who misrepresents in this very transaction, on the ground that
he does not come into court with clean hands. Both principle
and the weight of authority, therefore, seem to concur in the
view that a fraud once committed cannot be purged against the
will of the party defrauded.
Edwin H. Abbot, Jr.
Boston, Mass.
